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It was Edmund Burke who, after the French Revolution, wrote, "But the age of
chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and
the glory of Europe is extinguished forever." I suppose that the presence of an
economist on this program-in fact of two economists-might lead some to contend
that the glory of medicine is similarly extinguished.
There are in fact those who suggest that the recent flowering ofmedical economics
has helped push medicine from its pedestal down into the grubby marketplace and
has altered-for the worse-the waylaymen and even the way physicians think about
health care. I acknowledge that concern. I, too, am distressed with the new language.
I am troubled when I hear about marketing committees in hospitals and when
physicians speak of satisfied customers instead of patients. I do not believe it is
entirely healthy to substitute the word "producer" for the word "physician" or
"consumer" for "patient." Words, language do affect attitudes and attitudes do affect
behavior.
Nevertheless, I do not agree that the glory of medicine is extinguished or, indeed,
that if it were, the proximate cause would betheflowering ofmedical economics. The
intrusion of economic concerns into medicine, after all, did not begin-as some
would have us believe-in 1965 with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. The
Code of Hammurabi almost four thousand years ago discusses fees, fee structures,
and price discrimination. Furthermore, if economics is about the allocation of
resources (and it is), economics has been with us and with medicine from the earliest
days.
It is not the study of economics or the growth of medical economics that has
created a nexus between economics and medicine. The interplay was always there.
That interplay is more evident today as we find ourselves in a world in which
medicine can do more; in which many of the things it can do require substantial
resources; and in which diminishing rates of economic growth, that is, a slowing
down in the expansion of resources, force us to choose in areas in which we believed
choices were not necessary. The problem, unfortunately, does not derive from health
economists and cannot be solved by our elimination.
Health economists examine the interplay between economics and medicine, its
dimensions, forms, and arrangements. It is that interplayI should like to discuss with
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.special reference, of course, to physician manpower and to manpower policy. We will
have to range outside the narrow perspective of manpower supply and demand. The
rnedical care system and its various facets are interrelated. Policies in one arena affect
policies elsewhere. A full and comprehensive treatment of physician manpower
would have to address issues of organization, reimbursement, regionalization,
taxation, and financing. A full treatment could not ignore medical research, medical
education, and even such things as urban, transportation, and migration policies.
What physicians do and how they do it is influenced by a large number of variables.
We shall try to touch upon some ofthese matters; others, however, will necessarily be
omitted. Though I would like to support President Reagan's efforts to increase
American productivity by producing the same product in less time, I cannot convert
an entire course into a brief lecture simply by speaking more rapidly.
Two additional brief comments need to be made. First, let me note that in speaking
of economics, I do not imply that other social science disciplines have little to offer in
understanding American medicine and American health care policy with regard to
manpower. I emphasize the economic dimension not because, in the words of Paul
Samuelson, "Economics is the queen of the social sciences," but, rather, because I
happen to be an economist. Second, many of you will perhaps find much of what I
will say intuitively obvious. If so, take heart. In the words of M. Jourdain, "Good
heavens! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it."
Many of you have been thinking, perhaps even speaking, economics without
knowing it. You should not find this troubling, though I would hope that ifyou think
and speak economics you will do it well; that is, that your vocabulary be richer than
the two words "supply" and "demand."
There are many places where one could begin our story; many fram.eworks within
which we could paint our picture. Let me begin by reminding ourselves of the
important difference between the services that physicians produce or offer and the
goods and services produced elsewhere in the economy. That difference is important
in understanding the special characteristics that encompass the delivery of health
care. Today we hear it argued that the problems in medicine, including the problem
of rising prices and increasing expenditures, can be solved by making medicine more
like other parts of our economy-by increasing competition and strengthening
competitive markets. The efficacy of any such solution, however, hinges on the
similarities and on the differences between medical care and other goods and services.
Those similarities and differences bear examination. They also bear examination
because, whether or not one agrees with the conclusions of the Report of the
Graduate Medical Education National Advisory Committee (GMENAC), those
differences provide the presumedjustification for the existence of such a report. After
all, even before asking whether GMENAC is right or wrong, we have the right to ask,
Why GMENAC at all? The federal government does not issue such reports for every
occupation. It does not, for example, call upon law schools, schools of social work,
and schools of education to cut back their enrollments. GMENAC exists because
some people believe that medicine is different.
The first point to be noted is that physicians' services are services. They are not
goods produced in factories, boxed and shipped to various distribution centers, put
up on shelves, or kept in inventory awaiting buyers. The medical care industry would
be much more readily understood and would operate very differently if physicians'
services could be produced, shipped or stored, and distributed like Kellogg's corn
flakes. I recall vividly the important difference that hit home when I served at
successive intervals as a member of two public commissions. The first dealt with
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hunger and malnutrition in the United States. The Board ofInquiry met for a period
of time, reviewed the relevant data, and considered how to make it possible for
people without sufficient income to have enough food. The options were relatively
clear: one could give people food; one could give people money which they might use
to buy food; and one could give people some form of currency (call it food stamps, if
you will) that they could use to buy food but only food. At no point in the life ofthe
Commission did we have to address the question, If people had the wherewithal to
buy the food, would there be food stores in their community? At no point did we
consider the need for special programs to train food store managers or to induce such
individuals to move to West Virginia or other areas where people were hungry. Of
course, I do not mean to imply that the market for food is fully competitive. I am
aware that prices in some food stores in areas of poverty are higher than those
charged for equivalent goods in suburbia. I am aware that there are differences in the
quality of fruits, vegetables, and meat in different parts of the same city, but the
essential problem of obtaining enough food seemed to us the problem of income, not
of food distribution system reform.
Some years later I served on a commission that dealt with the problem of health
care in America: how to improve access to care. Ofcourse, we addressed the fact that
poverty represented a barrier to care. We discussed how that barrier might be
reduced. We were aware that there are federal programs like Medicaid that will pay
for the care that is obtained, and we discussed whether these programs were equitable
and efficient. But our agenda encompassed a broad area that the commission on
hunger did not need to address. The commission on health care could not assume
that if we gave people in West Virginia the money or the stamps or the Medicaid
assistance that would enable them to purchase care that care would be available.
Kellogg will ship corn flakes to Appalachia if people have the currency with which to
buy corn flakes, but physicians' services cannot be shipped to Appalachia. It is not
enough for West Virginia to have a Medicaid program. Medical services must be
produced by people, many of whom are professionals, on the spot and that means
that we have to be certain that there are enough professionals and that the incentive
structures will induce them to locate where they are needed. Professional services are
produced by professionals. Professionals have their own needs and tastes and wants.
These affect their distribution and their distribution, in turn, determines the availabil-
ity of care.
Physicians, though professionals, are different from many other professionals.
Most physicians are self-employed. This is in sharp contrast to the situation facing
other Americans and other professionals. The vast majority of the students with
whom you went to college are, or will be, working for someone else. They will be
employed and that means they will look for jobs and try to find some firm that is
prepared to hire them. They will prefer certain locations and certain firms, but they
may find that they must compromise. A student who studied the violin and who likes
Boston may apply for work with the Boston Symphony Orchestra, but the BSO does
not stand ready to hire every qualified violinist who would like to be a member ofthe
Orchestra. And so the budding violinist may give up the dream of Boston and accept
employment with the Hartford Symphony. Alternatively, enamored of Boston,
unwilling to leave, he or she may give up the violin and drive a cab. Most Americans
face a job market. Some firm, constrained by a budget, must hire them. Though we
may not be happy with the way the game plays out, we do not consider the influence
of the market an abridgement of our freedom.
But medicine is different. Because physicians are self-employed, because ofvarious
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physicians have been able, in large measure, to choose what they want to practice,
where they want to practice, and the patients whom they would serve. They define
these as essential freedoms. In contrast to most of the rest of us-whether we are
teachers or reporters or auto workers-physicians view attempts-even indirect
attempts-to influence their decisions as abridgements of their freedom.
Of course my story is incomplete. Some ofyou, quite correctly, would respond that
I move too quickly. Though the comparison is distasteful, you might argue that
physicians are not employees but small, independent businessmen. Physicians are like
others who have the freedom to open a TV repair shop or plant store or wine and
cheese store wherever they see fit. Small businesses, however, face a certain market
discipline. The fourth wine and cheese shop on the fourth corner of an intersection
may go under or, ifsuccessful, mayforce one or more ofthe other shops to close. The
fourth plant store may not succeed in spite of the owner's best efforts to convince
customers that his plants are better or that his prices are lower or that really they
ought to come back next Thursday for one more plant. Physicians face neither the
employment market that I spoke of earlier nor the market discipline that I speak of
now. We hear of the phenomenon of overdoctoring; we do not hear of a similar
phenomenon, overplant storing. Physicians can, and data show they do, affect the
level of demand for their services. Ofcourse one can arguewith thedata, as I suppose
is true with all data. Does the fact that we have more neurosurgeons and more
neurosurgery than does Britain mean that perhaps they don't have enough? Neverthe-
less, the conclusion is clear. Given the variability among both patients and physi-
cians, given the lack ofknowledge on the part ofpatients, given an attitude that more
must mean better, physicians have an opportunity to affect the level of demand.
Finally, given the way most physicians derive their income, in particular from a fee-
for-service mechanism that gives special rewards to procedures and far fewer rewards
to time, many physicians respond to the incentive structures byincreasing utilization.
Economists and students of the health care system may decry this phenomenon and
may suggest that it leads to waste, but economists are sensitive to the fact that one
man's waste is another man's income. Waste is not something that can be easily cut
out. It is not the strip offat on the edge ofa steak; it is themarbleized fat ingrained in
the meat itself. That which is fat in the medical system is also deeply ingrained in the
very structures and organization of medical care.
And so it is that physicians, to a significant degree, have been able to escape both
the discipline oflookingfor ajob and findingsomeone who wants to hire them within
a budget and the discipline of a market where consumers use current income to buy
that which, in theirjudgment, will provide them satisfaction commensurate with the
expenditure. Physicians have been free to select their patients, to select their
specialty, and to select their location.
We can make the story even more complete by noting that the structure for
payment of medical care services is heavily influenced by the existence of insurance.
Insurance and third-party payment removes discipline from the patient. My state-
ment that people spend money on other goods and services in relation to the
satisfaction that those goods and services bring to the costs of those services has few
analogies in medicine. On the one hand, patients know very little about medical care,
cannot predict what might happen in the absence of care, cannot balance their
impressions against the comments by experts in white coats, believe they may be
dealing with matters of life and death. On the other hand, with third-party payment,
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patients are often unaware of price and feel that medical care is essentially a free
good.
This is not the place to amplify the implications of third-party payments;
nevertheless, I cannot leave the subject without invoking a rule that I set for myself
when I first entered teaching. I had just read a short, whimsical article by Heywood
Broun reprinted in a collected edition of his works. Broun discussed how he became
(what he called) a "red." It seems that he was taking a two-semester course in what
Broun called "radical panaceas and their underlying fallacies" at Harvard. In the fall
and winter semester, a series of guest lecturers were invited to speak to the class.
There were anarchists, syndicalists, socialists, single-taxers, and the like. Broun
apparently was quite impressed by the failings of the capitalist system. In the spring
and summer semester, the faculty member spent the lecture hours tearing apart the
presentations that had been offered in the fall. But, as your President is aware, the
Boston Red Sox had quite a team (including Tris Speaker) in the spring of 1908.
Broun spent his time at the ball park. He didn't attend class and never heard the
answers to the radical arguments: "I went out into the world the fervent follower of
all things red, including the Boston Red Sox." And so I invoked a rule: never say
anything that is wrong in the first half ofthe class with the intention of correcting it in
the second half. Some students will be at the ballgame and others will surely have
fallen asleep. They will not hear the correction. So, though I will not discuss the
matter fully, I must note that my remarks on third-party payment should not cause
some of you to leap to a wrong conclusion: that Fein advocates the abolition of
insurance or at least advocates higher deductibles and higher coinsurance as a way to
make consumers price-conscious. I do not believe that the problems that American
medicine faces can be cured by that device-and certainly cannot be cured while
retaining what degree of equity we have achieved.
Back, then, to our story. Ifphysicians face few constraints in assuring a demand for
their services, if they face consumers who are loath to question authority, if they do
not compete vigorously in regard to price, if the ethics of the profession abjure
advertising, the competitive market conditions that, on occasion, are found elsewhere
in the economy are absent. Furthermore, the modes of payment, the role of
government as a third-party payer, the concern on the part of government with the
health and welfare of the people-all these and more-have created a situation in
which government has pursued a variety of public policies designed to affect the
provision of medical care: aid to medical schools, assistance to students, a National
Health Service Corps, health planning, loans to fledgling health maintenance
organizations, PSROs, a National Center for Health Statistics, a National Center for
Health Services Research, a National Center for Health Care Technology, and so
forth. All of these stand in sharp contrast to the competitive marketplace.
These various public programs have expanded in recent years. In part, the
expansion reflects the expansion of government itself, the growth of congressional
staffs, the multiple committees that deal with health matters in both House and
Senate. In part, however, it reflects an increasing concern, a preoccupation, if you
will, with health care expenditures and their impact on the federal budget, largely
through Medicare and Medicaid. I do not believe that it is an exaggeration if I
suggest that the critical dimension used in assessing almost each and every possible
government health activity is no longer the possible impact on the health of the
population or on equity in the provision of health care. The critical dimension has
become the proposal's possible impact on health care expenditures and on the federal
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David Stockman. If one traces the history of Professional Standards Review
Organizations, if one examines the language used in recent years concerning health
planning and the criteria developed to assess its accomplishments, one finds a
preoccupation with health care costs. Indeed, I believe that much, though by no
means all, of the interest in the GMENAC Report stems from a concern about health
care expenditures.
The GMENAC Report, of course, is not the first report on physician manpower.
Concern with the aggregate supply of physicians has a long history. I commend to
you the introductory material and first chapter of the Flexner Report, now 70 years
old. The nature of the discussion, however, has changed-and almost cyclically.
Flexner was concerned about overproduction ofphysicians (and, ofcourse, about the
large number of poorly trained physicians). The Lee-Jones Study, almost 50 years
ago, was concerned about a shortage of physicians. The Report by President
Truman's Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation, almost 30 years ago,
focused on distributional considerations (exclusively, geographic) and concluded that
it could not determine the dimensions of the shortage. The Surgeon General's
Consultant Group on Medical Education-which some in this audience may
remember as the Bane Committee-reporting 20 years ago, concluded that it would
be virtually impossible for the U.S. to maintain the existing physician-population
ratio (then at 141 and now at 171 physicians per 100,000 population) given the
projected population growth and output of medical schools.
The most recent report is the Graduate Medical Education National Advisory
Committee (GMENAC) Report issued in the fall of 1980. It projects a supply of
535,000, a physician-population ratio of 220, and a surplus of 70,000 physicians in
1990 and a supply of 643,000, a ratio of 247, and a surplus of 145,000 physicians in
the year 2000. The year 2000 seems distant but it isn't. The year 2000 is only as far
from today as today is from the inauguration ofJohn F. Kennedy. In spite ofall that
has happened since, for many of us that is yesterday.
If we examine the various reports and their very different projections ofthe future,
we cannot help but be struck by the varying definitions of shortage and surplus and
by the varying methodologies employed in making projections. In general, however,
the projections attempted to assess the balance between future supply and future
needs (or what GMENAC calls "requirements"). Supplywas typically measured by a
head count (more correctly, a degree count)-how many M.D.s were there and how
many would there be. Except for the Lee-Jones Study, future needs were assessed by
extrapolating physician-population ratios for the nation or forwell-endowed regions.
Naturally this gave tremendous weight to population projections.
Clearly such projections of physician supply, ofshortages and surpluses, were very
primitive. They assumed existing financing mechanisms, the current organization
and patterns of care, stable hours and productivity, few advances in medical
knowledge, and so forth. They ignored possible changes in disease patterns, in states
of health (say, as a result of changes in living conditions and economic well being),
and in demand for care(say, as a result ofrisingincome and the spread ofinsurance).
They assumed that future needs and demands (the ability to convert need into the
desire and ability to purchase health care services in the marketplace) were stable.
Most important, they focused on the supply and need for personnel, not on the
supply and need for medical services which, after all, can be produced in varying
ways, with different kinds ofpersonnel, and with the substitution ofcapital for labor.
Economists tend to be suspicious of such projections. We do not assume stable
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production functions for health or for other goods and services. We do not believe
that production systems are, or need to be, rigid and inflexible. To some degree,
capital can be substituted for labor. To some extent that which we now call physician
services can be produced by non-physicians. We see M.D.s as a means to an end, not
as an end in themselves. Many of us are uncomfortable when we hear the word
"surplus," especially when the word is spoken by those already in the field-be they
orthodontists, airline pilots, barbers, TV repairmen, or M.D.s.
Believing in change and in the ability to respond to change, economists have an
inherent skepticism about the validity of occupational projections and especially
about using those projections for policy purposes to limit new entrants or to increase
them. We prefer to allow for individual decisions based on individual tastes and
priorities as influenced by market signals concerning wages and incomes. Ifthere is a
"shortage" of computer programmers, salaries will rise and school teachers will shift
to programming. If there is a "surplus" of chefs, chefs' salaries will fall and, at the
margin, some persons will opt for other careers.
Wouldst that the world did work as smoothly as some economists view it, that the
market were flexible, that information were available, that responses did not involve
long lags, that-and so on. In any case, even if parts of the economywere to operate
that way-and obviously some do-that is not the world of medicine. The world of
medicine is not the world of a freely and quickly adjusting competitive system. It is a
world in which we do not believe in caveat emptor(let the buyer beware). It is a world
that has erected accreditation and licensure procedures to protect consumers. It is a
world in which the price mechanism is not given free rein to ration care. It is a world
in which supply does not adjust rapidly: it takes a long time to train and even longer
to educate a physician. It is a world in which curiosities abound: in areas where there
are many physicians, fees are higher rather than lower (as physicians try to achieve
some target income). It is not a world in which market signals in regard to fees and
incomes lead to adjustments in supply. Psychiatrists do not become surgeons, and
medical students consider economic forces as only one of many different influences
on their practice decisions. Let me suggest that we cannot rely on signals generated by
a poorly functioning market to measure shortage or surplus, as we cannot rely on a
broken thermometer to measure temperature.
Thus, whatever my general skepticism concerning the validity and utility of
occupational projections for planning purposes, I am not prepared to argue that
health care planningcan or should be replaced by a reliance on the market, on signals
sent by a thermometer that is inappropriate-inappropriate because the market does
not function in a competitive fashion and because, even if it were to do so, market
solutions would not assure an equitable distribution of health care services. Nor do I
suggest that manpower planning can be done by individual schools, that there is no
place for federal planning. There is a federal stake, and it does not derive solely from
the presence of federal dollars for education, research, and payment for services. The
aggregate supply of manpower and its geographic and specialty distributions do
affect access to care, and the federal government has been and ought to be concerned
with equity in access. Government is not only about cutting budgets and about costs
and expenditures. It is also about distribution and fairness andjustice-about how to
share the fruits of progress and how to bear the pain of sacrifice-what Howard
Cossell would call the ecstasy of victory and the agony of defeat.
But if, for all the reasons already cited, the market does not send us the correct
signals about the aggregate supply of physicians, should we accept the GMENAC
recommendations as a substitute for market information? I would urge caution and
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number of technical forecasting problems that I do not believe are fully resolved by
the statistical manipulations contained therein; (2) the GMENAC Report, in my
view, fails to specify the nature ofthe problem, that is, the presumed disadvantages of
a physician surplus, and does not ask whether those specific disadvantages can be
addressed in ways other than by restricting entry to the profession. Nor does it
address the possible social costs that may accompany a restriction of entry.
Though the technical problems inherent in projections are interesting and impor-
tant, I will not dwell on them. I believe that, in the limited time at our disposal, it
would be more interesting and more fruitful to examine the latter issue. Even so, a
few words on the numbers are in order. It is clear that it is almost inevitable that in
projecting the future we are governed by the present. The question is, How adequate
are present conditions? Can we expect and do we want present patterns ofpractice to
continue in the future? I believe we ought to be prepared for a decline in the
physician's average number of hours worked per week and even in the number of
patients seen per hour. Today, almost half of all ambulatory office visits are less than
ten minutes in duration. Perhaps, before we readily accept a cutback in enrollments,
we should discuss the kind ofmedical care we would like to see delivered. Perhaps we
should encourage a growth in physician supply, a growth that-if fees were
restructured-would encourage longer rather than shorter visits.
But those remarks relate to the projected numbers. I would prefer we focus on
more basic questions. Let us begin by asking what lies behind the concern about a
surplus. I would suggest that the GMENAC Report, though it does not state the
problem explicitly, is concerned about costs, the costs of educating "unnecessary"
personnel and the cost of medical care such personnel will help generate. The
important paragraph in the Report reads:
There will be too many physicians in 1990. There will be substantial imbal-
ances in some specialties. There will continue to be a marked unevenness in
the geographic distribution of physicians. The country may be training too
many nonphysician providers for 1990. The factors influencing specialty
choices are complex. The actual cost of graduate medical education is
unknown. Economic motivation in specialty and geographic choice is uncer-
tain.
I regret that the Report does not tell us what "too many" means. I infer, however,
that part of the problem, though perhaps not all of it, is that too many means it will
be too expensive; that is, we will face unnecessary costs in educating personnel and in
delivering services. On the first matter, I can only regret that the financing ofmedical
education in the United States remains a bizarre and inconsistent improvisation. In
spite of a series of good, bad, and mediocre reports-every approach has been
attempted-federal policy remains incoherent and incomplete. It takes little account
of the complex relationships between teaching, research, and service and between
undergraduate and graduate medical education. One can only sympathize with
students and faculty who face a set of health manpower policies and programs that
are buffeted by exogenous variables and that are developed in a less than coherent
fashion. Indeed, the situation is so unstable that, on occasion, faculty members even
find themselves sympathizing with those who must lead medical schools and who
must be concerned about budgets-that is, with Deans.
The issues in the financing of medical education are many and complex, and the
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federal role needs examination. It does not make sense for taxpayers, many ofwhom
are of low income, to support the training of people who may not be needed but who
will earn high incomes. But if that is the expense we are concerned about, the answer
need not lie in cutting the number of students; rather, it may lie in new ways of
financing medical education itself.
Similarly, the answer to the fear ofever-rising expenditures on medical care may lie
in changes in fee schedules, including the imbalance between payments for services
provided in inpatient and outpatient settings and the relative payment levels among
specialties and in the various geographic areas. How much and how physicians are
paid and reimbursed for their various activities affects the distribution of care, the
nature ofthose activities, and total costs. In my own view, the cost problem should be
addressed in a manner that would integrate the costs of medical education and the
future incomes of physicians. I would find merit in free medical education and lower
future incomes. I recognize of course that others may disagree and, in any case, that
that does not solve all the problems.
Unfortunately, however, the policy recommendations in the GMENAC Report do
not deal effectively with financing issues, and this in spite of the fact that many who
read the Report will accept its recommendations because of their concern with
dollars. Nor does the Report offer a realistic set of proposals designed to alter the
geographic or specialty distribution. Nor is there adequate analysis of how the
substantial cutbacks in enrollment called for would affect distributional considera-
tions. In the past, I have written that surpluses do not ensure that distributional
problems will be solved, that creating physicians because Appalachia or Harlem are
without sufficient services will not bring those physicians and their services to
Appalachia or Harlem. Nevertheless, policies to deal with maldistribution are easier
to develop and implement in a loose rather than in a tight market. One does not have
to believe in the efficacy of trickle-down theories to suggest that recent social history
documents only too well that redistribution is easier to accomplish when an economy
and when a sector within that economy are growing than when the economy or the
particular sector is stable or declining.
Nor is the distribution of practitioners the only distributional issue that demands
our concern. If medical schools reduce enrollments, it will be that much more
difficult to improve the representation of various income and minority groups in
these smaller student bodies. A restriction of enrollment is synonymous with a
restriction of educational opportunity. Whatever the problems created by having
"too many" physicians, it would be helpful to be equally explicit about the difficulties
associated with a less ample supply. It may be that if we ranked the difficulties
involved in having too many and the difficulties involved in having a less ample
supply that we would choose to have too many rather than too few.
What I have suggested is that manpower supply cannot be looked at without
considering the whole environment of medical practice. Having said that, let me be
clear that the problem does not lie in the fact that Dr. Tarlov and his colleagues
missed the point. The problem lies elsewhere. The Congress and the Executive
Branch have preferred to use partial models and have preferred to ignore side effects,
organizational and financing issues. Though the key issues involve the socioeconomic
environment of medical practice, the federal government has been unwilling to deal
directly with these issues. To address the socioeconomic environment of medical
practices means, among other things, to take on a most difficult political fight with
the profession. In order to increase the probability of winning that fight, the
government would have to do a better job than it has done in the past of explaining
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has generated a greater and greater frustration. In the lashing out that accompanies
that frustration, we have witnessed (and I suspect will continue to witness) more and
more attempts to control medical schools and to control entry into the profession.
Thus, my quarrel with GMENAC does not lie inwhat it was asked to do as much as it
lies in the context in which the questions were asked and in the fact that a number of
other questions were omitted.
Those questions are difficult to ask and difficult to answer. They relate to the
structure of American medicine. To ask them requires that we recognize that we have
been engaged in a remarkable experiment in the United States, an experiment in
which the government expresses its concern for health care by enacting a variety of
programs and by funding Medicare and Medicaid but is unwilling to regulate
effectively the delivery system. Such an experiment is probably doomed to failure. It
is likely not to be fully effective in improving access and health care and, at the same
time, is likely to be very expensive. A control mechanism is required and two such
mechanisms have been suggested: one approach argues that the necessary control
mechanism can be obtained through the creation of competitive markets; the other
approach has argued that the control mechanism can be built into a national health
insurance program. These two contrasting views will continue to be debated.
Medicine will continue to interact and intersect witheconomics. Theissues are not
resolved. It is to be hoped that the public, that the profession, that the Executive
Branch and the Congress will learn more about the subtleties and nuances of the
economic organization of medicine. In my view, only if that occurs can we be
optimistic that the solutions we choose will have a greater probability of successful
implementation. American medicine is not healthy, but it is not going to be made
stronger by treating the wrong patient with a partial therapy for a misdiagnosed
ailment.
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